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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the unique institution of the Japanese press
industry called kisha club system, which is deemed as the symbol of media
capture by the government, and collusion in the media industry. By tracing
through its history, we show how the institution has developed as a result
of the government’s attempt to control the media, and the media’s incen-
tive to use the alluring opportunity provided by the government to limit
the rivalry within the industry. We find that the distribution of political
power is a major factor behind the collusive press-politics relationship. By
providing a simple model that links the distribution of political power and
the media capture, we explain why this institutional arrangement has been
so persistent in Japan.
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1 Introduction
It goes without saying that the so-called fourth estate of government plays
vital roles in the policy processes. While most countries have media of some
description, their mere existence is no guarantee that they are an effective
vehicle for critical scrutiny of the government actions. As Besley, Burgees,
and Prat (2002) discuss, the media affect political outcomes through auditing
(sorting and discipline), and setting agendas. Many have long noted the lack
of those functions in Japanese press.
Japanese press has instigated criticism in recent years with respect to their
tendencies and political stances. The common thread running through this
criticism is that they are almost identical in their reportage, selection of news,
and even in their headlines, makeup, and format. Furthermore, there is a great
deal of uniformity in the degree of emphasis attributed to a particular news
item and items selected for major treatment being remarkably similar.
The common denominator of their concern is the existence of the press club
system called kisha club system – literally means reporters’ club in Japanese.
Kisha club system is deemed as the symbol of media capture by the government,
and collusion within the media. It is hard to find similar institution outside of
Japan. The unique characteristic of the club system is that it has the defining
features of a cartel. Firstly, membership to the club is limited to an exclusive
group of news organizations (including major newspapers, broadcast stations,
and wire services) that hold a virtual monopoly over news sources. Secondly,
there are strict rules governing activities of members which prohibit much of
independent and investigative reporting. Lastly, there are strong punishments
against violators of these rules and effective means of enforcing them.
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The important questions that need to be answered are why this unique
institution exists, and is so persistent in Japan. By tracing through the history
of kisha club system, we show how the institution has developed as a result of
the government’s attempt to control the media, and the media’s incentive to
use the alluring opportunity provided by the government to limit the rivalry
within the media industry. Therefore, the monopolization of the information is
mutually beneficial to the government and the media.
In Section 2, we first look into the organizational structure and the collusive
mechanism of the kisha club system. In Section 3, we briefly review the historical
development of the kisha club system. Then we review the nature of political
landscape in the postwar era of Japan that nurtured the media capture in Section
4.
The history suggests that the distribution of political power has a great
impact on the collusive press-politics relationship. In Section 5, we present a
simple model that captures this intuition, and makes precise the socio-economic
conditions under which the media are captured.
Besley and Prat (2006) is the first to analyze the media capture phenomenon.
Their model analyzes the effectiveness of the political process at weeding out
“bad” politicians when there is the risk of media capture. In other words, it
identifies the conditions under which media are captured in the face of an ad-
verse selection problem. Their model cannot, however, analyze the effect of
political power distribution on the degree of media freedom. More specifically,
we construct a model that differs from Besley and Prat (2006) in the following
respects: (i) Besley and Prat (2006) considers a one-shot game, while we ex-
plicitly take into account the repeated interaction between the media and the
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political parties, (ii) in Besley and Prat (2006), the election outcome depends
solely on whether bad news about the incumbent politician is reported, while
we assume it also depends stochastically on the distribution of political power,
and (iii) we restrict the favor exchange between political parties and the media
to the release of information only.
In the concluding section, we argue that our model well explains the per-
sistence of the institutional arrangements in the press industry in the postwar
era of Japan.
2 Kisha Club System
Organizational Structure A kisha club is a formal association of reporters
assigned to one beat. Each of the around one thousand different agencies of the
government, law courts, police headquarters, political party centers, and major
economic organizations in Japan allocates a large room to reporters responsible
for covering that agency for their news organizations. This room serves as
the base and operation room for the reporters to gather, confirm, organize, and
write all the news. Usually, the rooms are located on the second or third floor of
government-agency buildings or party headquarters, which are near the office
of the head of the particular agency. Depending on the nature of the agency
and its importance, each club has anywhere from a dozen to three hundred or
more reporters.
According to Feldman (1993), press clubs also exist in other countries, e.g.,
the National Press Club in the United States. Also a similarity can be found
between the press club and the Lobby, a formal association of newspaper and
broadcast reporters who work out of the Palace of Westminster in England. It
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is considered to be the key mechanism through which a considerable amount
of political information from government finds its way into the public domain.
Kisha club differs from them in terms of its structure and functional charac-
teristics. First of all, unlike press clubs in other countries, which are organized
and sponsored by information sources, kisha clubs are organized and managed
by news media associations: the Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors
Association (Nihon Shimbun Kyo¯kai). Membership in these clubs, and conse-
quently, access to important news sources, has traditionally been limited to
mainstream journalists: around 100 daily newspapers, four news agencies and
about 40 broadcasters that belong to the associations of the Japanese media.
Within each kisha club, reporters generally share the same access to re-
sources. All reporters witness the same events, and receive the same briefings
and handouts on their assigned beat. All are exposed to news sources at the
same time, which are usually conveyed either during formal press conferences
or in relaxed background briefings held regularly by top officials. The reporters
in each club take turns handling administrative tasks as secretaries. Their work
includes mediation and coordination between the reporters and the sources of
information they are covering, and related organizational matters. More im-
portant tasks of the secretaries are to collect the questions that reporters intend
to ask especially in advance of press conferences to be aired live on television,
present these questions to the sources, and negotiate who gets to ask which
questions. In return for their efforts, each secretary gets the privilege of asking
one of the first questions.
Collusive Nature & Punishment Mechanism In the clubs, reporters are
bound by certain rules and those who violate these rules will be punished
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for “damaging the press club’s friendship and honor.” Punishments some-
times take the form of exclusion from the club. The specific rules vary, but
always are aimed at preventing friction between news sources and reporters,
and preventing news sources from feeling discomfort or irritation. According
to de Lange (1998) and Feldman (1993), most kisha clubs have a“blackboard
agreement.” Each club has a blackboard listing upcoming events related to
the agency being covered. It includes scheduled meetings of the head of the
agency, planned press conferences and announcements about topics to be dis-
cussed. The “blackboard agreement” stipulates that reporters will not write
stories based on the information on this board, including, for example, the fact
that an official is scheduled to explain a particular issue a few days later. Many
have deemed this “self-censorship” as one of the most noteworthy aspects of
kisha club system.
These rules and protocols force reporters to conform with colleagues in ri-
val news organizations, and to cooperate while looking for newsworthy stories.
They often discuss current events among themselves, reaffirming their under-
standing of the news, exchanging information, and collectively composing an
outline of the story they will all file.
Concerns & Criticism for Kisha Club system Many authors have criticized
this kisha club system. In fact, Japan ranks 35th in the press freedom ranking
from FreedomHouse (2008):
More than half of the national newspaper market share is con-
trolled by “the big three”: the Yomiuri Shimbun, the Asahi Shim-
bun, and the Mainichi Shimbun. There is considerable homogeneity
in reports, which relate the news in a factual and neutral man-
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ner.....Concerns remain regarding the lack of diversity and inde-
pendence in reporting, especially in political news. The problem is
perpetuated in part by a system of kisha kurabu, or journalist clubs,
in which major media outlets have cozy relationships with bureau-
crats and politicians. Expose´s by media outlets that belong to such
clubs are frowned upon and can result in the banning of members
from press club briefings. Journalists therefore tend to avoid writing
critical stories about the government, reducing the media’s ability
to pressure politicians for greater transparency and accountability.
Most of Japan’s investigative journalism is conducted by reporters
outside the press club system. In recent years, the exclusivity of the
clubs has eroded as foreign journalists with press cards from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs are now guaranteed access to most offi-
cial press conferences; according to the International Press Institute,
the last significant kisha kurabu to bar foreign reporters is the one
that deals with the affairs of the emperor and his family. However,
with the exception of Nagano, where former governor Yasuo Tanaka
abolished the prefecture’s press clubs, Japanese magazine reporters,
online writers, and freelance journalists remain essentially barred
from club briefings, even as observers. [FreedomHouse (2008)]
Similar concerns abound. For example, de Lange (1998) describes:
[t]here seemed to be an uncanny similarity in the way different
newspapers wrote about current affairs, whether it be a newspaper
from the left, centre or right of the political spectrum. It seemed
to me that the majority of articles not only resembled each other in
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the choice of topic, but also in tone and perspective....[o]ne thing
that is all major Japanese newspapers have in common despite their
purported difference of editorial opinion, is their reliance on news
generated by the press club.
This institution shaped the unique press-politics relationship in Japan. By
reinforcing their close ties with official sources while restricting competition
among reporters, Japanese media have built a unique relationship between
politicians and news outlets. Instead of anticipating stories and shaping emerg-
ing news, the Japanese press primarily responds to an agenda of political dis-
course that has already been set. As many have pointed out, the existence of
kisha club system seems to be mutually beneficial for politicians and media in
Japan, making it easier to control the access to and the dissemination of in-
formation about political events, as well as limiting rivalry among the media
companies.
3 History of Japanese Press & Kisha Club
In this section, we briefly review the history of Japanese press. This chapter
is based on Coughlin (1952), de Lange (1998), Freeman (2000), and Yamamoto
(1989).
3.1 Prewar Days
When the bakufu collapsed and civil war began in January 1868, the Meiji
government had to loosen the censorship just for its name’s sake since ”Meiji”
literally means the rule by enlightenment. Hence, in early years of that era,
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they could enjoy a limited amount of freedom of speech.
Even so, the new Meiji leadership soon realized that the press freedom
did more harm than good to the nation’s primary goal. Hence, once they
came to power, the Meiji government took various measures to kill or tame the
journalism through providing them financial stability, as well as using legal
and extralegal means to control the press. Because of these efforts, Japanese
journalists did not gain widespread access to government agencies.
Establishment of Kisha Club: Information Cartel The first-ever kisha club
was set up in the fall of 1890. In anticipation of the opening of the Diet, a
number of journalists from Tokyo newspapers formed an association called
”the Group of Journalists for Diet Access (Gikai Deiri Kishadan).” To coordinate
efforts to demand access to the Diet, journalists from local and regional papers
soon joined their Tokyo colleagues to form a new association, the Newspaper
Journalists’ Club.
Government officials eventually allowed the creation of a special room
within the Diet where journalists could gather to receive official news. This
room is generally recognized as Japan’s first official kisha club. In acceding to
the establishment of such a club, the government insisted on two rules: (i) only
those national daily papers and news agencies licensed by the government that
have published continuously for at least two years would be allowed the access
to the Diet proceeding, and (ii) only twenty gallery tickets per Diet session are
issued.
The first rule enabled the government to exclude new newspapers whose
political leanings were still unknown, and newspapers that had been banned or
suspended during previous two years. The limited access forced the members
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of the club to decide among themselves which journalists and newspapers
would have the access. This resulted in the exclusion of the regional and small
papers. Consequently, the establishment of the first kisha club gave Tokyo-based
newspapers the alluring opportunity to prohibit their rivals from having access
to information and sources, and monopolize information among themselves.
Media Capture The period from 1890 to 1910 saw the establishment of kisha
clubs in other organizations other than the Diet, including various government
agencies, parties, and police headquarters. These clubs began to formulate
rules and sanctions to regulate club members and their elite sources. Then
suddenly, around 1910, virtually all government agencies saw the formation of
kisha clubs. By 1925, there were twenty-seven clubs in Tokyo and many more
in the prefectures. By 1931, the number in Tokyo had risen to fifty-one, and
soared to eighty-four by 1939.
Yamamoto (1989) ascribes the sudden increase of kisha clubs to a policy
introduced by then Prime Minister Katsura. A series of newspaper articles
critical of the treaty he signed at Portsmouth at the end of the Russo-Japanese
War resulted in a riot, which ended his first cabinet. By the time Katsura es-
tablished his second cabinet, he recognized the opportunity kisha clubs offered
for controlling what news was reported, who reported it, and how. Conse-
quently, government agencies under his administration began a coordinated
effort to embrace journalists. In addition to being supplied with information,
journalists were also furnished with money, liquor, and women. Gradually, the
Japanese press began to print fewer articles openly critical of the government,
and newspapers began to look more and more alike. According to Yamamoto
(1989).
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It was from this time that the clubs changed from bare waiting
rooms to comfortably furnished, amiably staffed quarters for the
gathering of news. The switch from exclusion of to patronage of
the press clubs, then, was the clever stratagem of a prime minister
who had become wise in the ways of controlling men’s minds. In-
deed, far from excluding journalists from their midst, the ministers,
bureau chiefs, and other key officials of the Katsura administration
suddenly started offering lavish entertainment for the club members
several times a year. As Tetsu Nyoizen put it in Shin-ko¯ron, ”money,
liquor, and women” were temptations that few men have ever been
able to resist, and Katsura’s government had ”learned to exploit
these three great magic powers with consummate skill, to the point
that they have anesthetized the consciences of today’s reporters and
castrated them with surgical skill.” As a result, journalists ”fill their
papers with nothing but news that makes the government look
good.” [Yamamoto (1989)]
According to Freeman (2000), the defining characteristics of the current
kisha clubs were already in place by this time. (1) They had exclusive rules.
(2) Members made agreements with each other and with their sources about
what to publish and when to publish it, practicing self-censorship or group self-
censorship when necessary. (3) Smaller and provincial papers and magazines
were excluded. (4) The clubs had spread to locations outside of the Tokyo area,
particularly to government offices in provincial areas. (5) They had begun to
operate independently of their companies, yet increasingly in cooperation with
their official sources.
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3.2 During Wartime
Direct Control of Media In the early 1930s, Japan saw the rise of militarism.
In September 1932 representatives from a number of key government ministries
met and established an “information committee (joho iinkai)” to coordinate the
release of government information to the press.1) Originally, it was an extrale-
gal organization, and therefore the committee relied on a variety of informal
mechanisms, including ”administrative guidance” and ”consultations,” to keep
unfavorable news out of print and to influence the reporting of important sto-
ries.
In July 1936, the committee was placed under the control of the prime
minister’s office and renamed the Cabinet Information Committee (Naikaku
Joho Iinkai), then became the Cabinet Information Bureau (CIB) a year before the
outbreak of the Pacific War. The CIB served as an important source for official
reports on the war, and a key point of contact among newspaper management,
the kisha clubs, and the Japanese state.
Once the Pacific war began, the government introduced a series of mea-
sures to control the press, making the clubs an important part of the wartime
propaganda machine. Several key national daily newspapers allied with the
government to reduce the number of competitors in the industry. In 1941 the
managers and editors of the major national newspapers in Japan formed the
Japan Newspaper Union (Nihon Shimbun Renmei) to work with government
officials to overhaul the newspaper industry and bring the press clubs under
their joint control.
1)This included the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Army Ministry, Navy Ministry, Ministry of
Education, Home Affairs Ministry, and Communications Ministry.
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Oligopolistic Control by National Newspapers The number of newspapers
declined precipitously as they were merged to form a ”one-province-one-
paper” system, which aimed to limit to one the number of competing papers in
all the prefectures and administrative units except Tokyo, Osaka, and Fukuoka.
As a result, by 1943, of the 1,200 daily papers, 500 weekly magazines, and more
than 10,000 irregularly published newspapers that had existed in 1937, only 55
remained.
The union also worked with the government and standardized club regu-
lations, and forced adoption by the clubs to “carry out the national mission of
the press in cooperation with the government.” Under the new regulation, club
journalists were required to report to the union any violations of news story and
photography agreements, and any slander or libel of the club by a club member.
In the event of a violation, club regulations provided for the imposition of the
following sanctions: warning, suspension, expulsion, or cancellation from the
reporters’ list.
3.3 Postwar
Reestablishment ofKishaClubs After Japan’s defeat in 1945, the Occupation
authorities quickly abolished wartime press controls and removed all govern-
mental barriers to the free flow of information in Japan. But kisha club system
underwent no essential change.
The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas
MacArthur, kept the media organizations and kisha clubs basically intact. Ac-
cording to Freeman (2000), it was based on the wrong assumption that just
abolishing legal barriers to democracy, including the major press law enacted
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in 1909, would be enough to guarantee a free press. Despite the removal of
wartime constraints by SCAP, most of the prewar kisha clubs were soon reestab-
lished. The membership was limited to those companies that had belonged to
the clubs before or during the war, and only one or two of many newspapers
founded immediately after the war were allowed to join them. “In a fiercely
competitive and rapidly expanding postwar news field, the tightly monopolis-
tic control which a few newspapers held over the Reporters’ Clubs gave them
a decisive edge,” according to Coughlin (1952).
Newly established papers had no direct access to the main resource, the
official government information, and therefore, they could not succeed in con-
veying quality news. Even the nation’s number two news agency at that time,
the Jiji Tsushin, was excluded from all but a few of the clubs. Coughlin (1952)
argues that severe shortages the nation was experiencing at this time, and the
state’s ability to requisition goods for which journalists (and other citizens) had
a need helped the government to maintain a considerable degree of control
over club activities.2)
Eventually, the General Headquarters (GHQ) came to recognize the danger
of allowing the government to remain in control of the press. In November
1945, SCAP backed a group of club journalists who were attempting to gain
access to the committee meetings of the House of Peers. After the government
refused to respond to their demands for access, SCAP forced the House of Peers
to make the committee meetings accessible to the press, just as the Lower House
already had. However, this movement allowed the access to the Diet only to
2)“The government’s hold on the Reporters’ Clubs increased in direct ratio to the various short-
ages, as government ministries passed out rationed cigarettes, free train passes, tinned food, shoes,
uniforms and so on to the club members.” [Coughlin (1952)]
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those journalists who first of all had access to the clubs.
Attempts ofGHQ At the same time, the General Headquarters (GHQ) started
to realize the undemocratic nature of many club practices. SCAP sought to
influence over kisha club rules; especially the clubs’ ability to expel members
who refused to follow them. Freeman (2000) reports an incident that happened
in May 1946. The managing editor of a major newspaper, Yomiuri-Hochi, the
vice-president of the newspaper federation, and a journalist from the same
paper took part in a food demonstration sponsored by the Communist Party.
In an effort to get the prime minister to increase the supply of food, they pitched
a tent in front of the prime minister’s residence for a few days.
Not long after this incident, club members in the prime minister’s office
club (the Kantei club) expelled the newspaper from the club, claiming that its
journalists had impaired the honor and dignity of the club. The expulsion of
the paper did not last long because SCAP officials forced the club to reinstate
the paper as soon as they learned about the incident. Major Imboden, the
SCAP official responsible for reforming the Japanese press, criticized the club’s
action as follows: “Any action by anybody, official or non-official, which denies
access by any legitimate newspaper to governmental news sources cannot be
reconciled with the democratic concept of a free press. It is a disappointment
to the Press and Publications division that the Japanese press, which has a
paramount interest in the establishment and maintenance of freedom of access
to news, has failed to use its power to make impossible any such restriction of
this freedom as apparently has been imposed on the Yomiuri. What is tolerated
in regard to one newspaper may be inflicted later on any newspaper. It is
hoped that the Japanese press will act immediately to correct this situation
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in order to make it unnecessary for some other agency to act in its behalf.”
Although the club complied with SCAP’s demands by lifting its restrictions
on the newspaper in question, it did not lift the ban on the two individual
journalists. This move was supported by Major Imboden as he felt that the club
“had a right to discipline its individual members as long as such action did not
affect the operation of an entire newspaper.”
Consolidation of Kisha Clubs A number of incidents involving the press
clubs over the next three years led Major Imboden to inform the newly formed
Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association in August 1949 that it
either had to reform the press clubs or dissolve them altogether. In an attempt
to appease SCAP, the association defined clubs as organizations “for friend-
ship and socializing,” and not for news-gathering. The policy statement they
announced has remained in force until the present day.
However, bringing such a fundamental change about in practice proved
less easy. Far from what GHQ had envisioned, the policy statement only
created a sharp discrepancy between kisha clubs defined on paper and what
was taking place in reality. Since then the nature of kisha club system has
remained unchanged as we have argued repeatedly. The question is how we
can explain the preservation of this institutional arrangement. For this purpose,
we need to review the nature of Japanese politics in the next section.
4 Nature of Japanese Politics & News Gathering
In this section, we briefly review the political landscape and press-politics
relationship in the postwar ear of Japan.
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One-and-a-Half-PartySystem(1955-1993) Postwar Japan used to be described
as a country with an one-and-a-half party system (all opposition parties counted
for half against the Big One, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)). From 1955,
the LDP, considered to be a “catch-all” party, has monopolized political leader-
ship for more than three decades. Many authors argue that part of the ruling
party’s success in staying in power for so long has been its ability to provide, as
a “catch-all party,” at least minimal satisfaction for all the sectors supporting it.
The party enjoyed a dominant position in the Diet, over cabinet, and govern-
ment offices. Major policy decisions inevitably revolve around the LDP and its
internal political processes.
In contrast, the opposition parties appeared to be weak and incompetent.
The opposition, headed by the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ), has not
been successful in offering a viable alternative to LDP policies. As a result, the
party had no appeal to a growing number of voters or to the general public as
a whole. One of the reason was their adherence to their traditional ideologies
and basic support groups. They were therefore resistant to changes, appeared
less efficient and fated to permanently remain opposition parties without the
slightest interest in assuming power. A major problem for the opposition had
been the difficulty in bridging the different stances of various parties, especially
with regard to the Japan-US Security Pact and the Self-Defense Forces, and in
forming a coalition of parties that could snatch political leadership away from
the LDP. SDPJ failed to offer convincing policy proposals, and voters snubbed
its stance of political negativism and ambiguity of the party platform.
While the LDP monopolized political power from 1955 to 1993, only a
handful of party leaders determined policy matters, personnel matters, and
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strategies. Therefore, during that era, reporters had to focus their efforts only on
few individuals, e.g., faction leaders, key ministers, and other veteran politicians
who were close to the top people. Reporters tended to attach great importance
to such information, and the mass media would use it as a news item and cited
them daily in their political stories. Well aware of reporters’ dependence on
them for information, experienced Diet members took advantage by controlling
the perspective of the news that reached the public according to Feldman (1993).
Changes in the Political Landscape (1993-2009) The year 1993 marked the
end of 38 years of continuous single-party ruling by the LDP, and the start of
a new era of coalition governments. In August of 1993, a coalition of anti-LDP
parties formed a government, which only lasted eight months. In spite of its
fleeting life-span, it was followed by a string of governments consisting of
various combinations of political parties.
The LDP did regain power in 1994, but only in partnership with allies in
coalition governments. Since 1993, no single party has managed to steer the
government of Japan.3) Throughout the decade that followed the historic fall
of the LDP’s monopoly of the power, authority was no longer in the hands of
a limited number of politicians, and the situation gradually started to change.
This was inevitable because a number of parties are now partners in a gov-
ernment dominated by the LDP. It has no choice but to discuss and adjust its
stance on issues in order to get measures passed. As a result, members of the
various ruling coalitions have engaged in debate and negotiation on policies
and legislation.
3)This paper was written before the election in 2009 when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)
took over. This paper’s point of view reflects our understanding at the time it was written.
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Feldman (2004) points out that a few factors also redirected reporters’ at-
tention and altered their selection of information sources. Among those, the
major reorganization of the central government ministries and agencies that
took place in January 2001 was substantial. Because not only did it affect the
political news sources to which reporters gave their attention, but it necessi-
tated structural and logistic adjustments on the part of the media as ministries
and agencies were re-configured.
As before 1993, even the largest opposing party has not been an effective
alternative to the LDP. The current biggest opposing party, the Democratic Party
of Japan incorporates members from a wide spectrum of political backgrounds,
which makes it hard for the party to achieve consensus on sensitive policy
issues like amending the Constitution, and be effective.4)5) Nevertheless, the
DPJ has become a major opposition force at least in terms of its size.
The history suggests that a high probability of the LDP being re-elected
makes it more likely that the media are captured. In other words, the distri-
bution of political power has a great impact on the degree of media freedom.
Therefore, in the next section, we present a model that captures the following
intuition: a strong political power makes the ruling party easier to maintain a
4)In 1993, Ichiro Ozawa, a former secretary general of the LDP, bolted from the party with
fellow lawmakers, leading the LDP to temporarily fall from power. Also in 1993, another group of
lawmakers defected from the LDP and created New Party Sakigake, whose members included the
current leader of DPJ Yukio Hatoyama. In 1996, some key members quit Sakigake, and established
the DPJ, which also included many SDPJ members. Two years later, the DPJ expanded further
to group together smaller forces that had left Shinshinto, a major opposition force that had been
created at Ozawa’s initiative in 1994. The party achieved its current makeup in 2003, when Ozawa’s
Liberal Party, which was formed in the wake of Shinshinto’s dissolution, joined the DPJ.
5)Some critics also point out that some DPJ lawmakers are more conservative than their LDP
counterparts on some issues.
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friendly relationship with the media.
5 Model
5.1 Setup
Time is discrete and infinite, t = 0, 1, 2, · · · . There are three types of players in the
game: a strong political party (denoted by S), a weak political party (denoted
by W), and n news companies. All political parties’ abilities are commonly
known, i.e., there is no adverse selection problem. In each period, only one
political party is ruling, and the strong party is ruling at date 0.
All players discount future payoffs by a common discount factor δ. The
objective of the political parties is to maximize the probability of getting elected.
The ruling political party can transfer benefits to the news companies through
granting them exclusive interviews and access to its press conferences. The
total value of the “bribe” that the ruling party can legally transfer to news
companies is I, which is costless for the ruling party. It will be shared equally
among news companies that receive this favorable treatment. If a party is not
ruling, it has no feasible way to grant favors to the news companies.
News companies’ objective is to maximize profit. In each period, a scandal
about the ruling party is revealed to the ALL news companies with probability
q. The news companies, upon learning a scandal about the ruling party, can
decide whether to report it to the public or not. If a party is not ruling, no bad
news or scandals about it can be learnt by the news companies.6) The market
value of a scandal is M. If more than one news company report the scandal, M
6)Alternatively, we can assume that only news about the ruling party carries market value to the
news companies.
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is shared equally among the revealing news companies.
For the analysis to be nontrivial, it is necessary that I > qM, for otherwise,
the ruling party is never able to bribe any news company.
At the beginning of each period, an election is held. The election outcome
depends probabilistically on the news reported by newspapers and the relative
strength of each party. When the strong party is ruling, the probabilities of
it getting re-elected are (i) Pr (S|∅) > 1/2 when no bad news is revealed to
the public, and (ii) Pr (S|BS) when bad news is reported, respectively. On the
other hand, when the weak party is ruling, the strong party is elected in the
following election day with probability (i) Pr (S|∅) if no scandal about the ruling
weak party is reported; and (ii) Pr (S|BW) if a scandal about the weak party is
reported. Since bad news is detrimental to the chance of being elected, we have
Pr (S|BS) < Pr (S|∅) < Pr (S|BW). For simplicity, we assume all these probabilities
are stationary over time.7) We designate the ratio α ≡ Pr (S|BW) /Pr (S|∅) as the
measure of how detrimental a scandal about the weak party is to its reelection
probability. We assume α is a constant larger than 1. This assumption enables
us to use Pr (S|∅) as a measure of how uneven the political power is distributed.
The strong party, in order to facilitate its collusion with the news industry,
may set up or promote the setting up of a press club. Within the press club,
the news companies can perfectly monitor each other’s action: any attempt
to report a scandal will be promptly detected by other news companies. If
reporting the scandal is against the interest of the press club as a whole, the
attempt to report the scandal will be deterred by other members of the club.
7)Implicitly assumed is that the probability of each party getting elected depends only on the
news reported in the most recent period. In other words, the voters’ memory is bounded to one
period.
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Therefore, the press club is essentially a cartel in news-reporting.
The weak party, being the opposition party at date 0, is the victim of media
capture. Therefore, it advocates abandoning the press club and promises media
freedom if elected.8) Due to reputation concerns which is not explicitly modeled
here, it will enforce its promise if elected. Thus, when the weak party is ruling,
the press club is abandoned. We also assume that weak party cannot collude
with any subset of news companies because of its pro-press-freedom campaign
promise.
The timing of the game is as follows. At the very beginning of the game,
the strong party decides whether to set up a press club or not. Afterwards, in
each subsequent period t,
1. The strong party, if it is ruling, decides to which news companies it grants
the benefit I.
2. A scandal about the ruling party may be revealed to all news companies
(An event that happens with probability q).
3. If the news company learns the scandal, it decides whether to report it or
not.
4. Conditional on the news reported to the public, the election outcome is
probabilistically determined.
We shall solve for subgame perfect equilibriums of the repeated game de-
scribed above. If there are multiple equilibriums, we assume that, the strong
party, being the ruling party at date 0, is able to coordinate players to play the
equilibrium most favorable to it.
8)In 2009, the leader of the largest opposing party, the DPJ, announced that they will dismantle
the kisha club system once they become the ruling party, which ironically no media have reported.
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5.2 Analysis
Below, we make precise the condition under which the collusion between the
strong party and news companies is sustainable. The implicit contract stipulates
that (i) the news companies should not report any bad news about the strong
party, and (ii) in exchange the strong party will grant the news companies
exclusive interviews and access to its press conferences when it is ruling.
Under the setup of the model, one can conceive the following three possible
press-politics relationships:
1. No press club is formed and every news company is free;
2. No press club is formed but the strong party attempts to capture the
media;
3. A press club is formed and colludes with the strong party.
If a press club is formed, the whole news industry essentially acts as a single
decision maker, which decides whether to collude with a political party or
not. Collusion is facilitated because there is now only one incentive constraint
instead of n constraints in the absence of a press club. The logic is similar to
that of Besley and Prat (2006).9)
5.2.1 Scenario 1
If every news company is independent, then each company’s payoff is Vind =
Mq/n. This is because a scandal is detected with probability q, in which case,
9)If q is endogenous, there is another reason why press club facilitates collusion: within the press
club: any observable deviation, i.e. an attempt to collect and report bad news about the ruling
party, is promptly detected and detered. The press club, as a device for perfect monitoring among
the news companies, lowers the choice of q.
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the companies share the market value M equally. Given the ruling party is not
bribing the news companies, the news companies do not conceal the scandals
they learn. Correctly anticipating this, it does not pay for the party to bribe the
news companies. In other words, repeated play of the static Nash equilibrium
is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game. The probability of
winning a election for the strong party is
(
1 − q) Pr (S|∅) + qPr (S|BS) when it is
ruling; and
(
1 − q) Pr (S|∅) + qPr (S|BW) when it is not ruling.
5.2.2 Scenario 2
Suppose no press club is formed but the strong party attempts to capture the
media. Let Vnps be the value of a news company when the strong party is
ruling, assuming that collusion between the news company and the strong
party is sustained. In order to achieve media capture, the ruling party must
collude with every individual news company in the industry. Therefore, the
maximum benefit that the ruling party can grant a news company in any
successful collusive scheme is I/n. Consequently, Vnps ≤ I/n.
The heaviest punishment that can be imposed on a deviating news company
is a reversion to the repeated play of the static Nash equilibrium described in
scenario 1 above. Thus, a necessary condition for the sustainability of collusion
between the strong party and a news company is
Vnps ≥ (1 − δ)
( I
n
+ M
)
+ δVind
= (1 − δ)
( I
n
+ M
)
+ δ
Mq
n
.
Since Vnps ≤ I/n, the above inequality holds only if
n ≤ δ
(
I −Mq)
M (1 − δ) .
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In other words, when the news industry is relatively large, i.e., n >
δ(I−Mq)
M(1−δ) ,
collusion is not sustainable without a press club. Intuitively, the reason why
collusion cannot be sustained in the absence of a press club is that with n sep-
arate relational contracts in place, the deviation profit gained by an individual
company is high: it grabs the whole market if it reports the scandal exclusively.
This difficulty is particularly severe when n is large. Therefore, any media-
government collusion requires the setting up of a press club when n >
δ(I−Mq)
M(1−δ) .
Below we limit our attention to such a case.
5.3 Scenario 3
Suppose a press club is formed, and it colludes with the strong party. Recall
the strong party is pro-press-club and the weak party is pro-press-freedom.
Whenever the strong party is ruling, the press club is in place and the collusion
between the press club and the government is in effect. Whenever the weak
party is ruling, the press club is dismissed as abandoning the press club is part
of its campaign promise.
If the strong party manages to collude with the media industry, the prob-
ability that the strong party wins an election is Pr (S|∅) when it is ruling; and(
1 − q) Pr (S|∅)+qPr (S|BW) when it is not ruling. Comparing these probabilities
to those in scenario 1, it is apparent that the strong party prefers an equilibrium
with collusion.
Let Vps be the value of a news company when the strong party is ruling and
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Vpw be the value when the strong party is not ruling. These values are given by
Vps = (1 − δ) In + δ
[
Pr (S|∅)Vps + (1 − Pr (S|∅))Vpw
]
,
and Vpw = (1 − δ) Mn q + δ

[
qPr (S|BW) + (1 − q) Pr (S|∅)]Vps
+
[
q (1 − Pr (S|BW)) + (1 − q) (1 − Pr (S|∅))]Vpw
 .
The incentive compatibility constraint for not reporting bad news about the
strong party reads
Vps ≥ (1 − δ)
( I + M
n
)
+ δVind (5.1)
= (1 − δ)
( I + M
n
)
+ δ
Mq
n
.
Proposition 1 A necessary and sufficient condition for the sustainability of media
capture by the strong party is given by
Pr (S|∅) ≥ C (I,M)
≡ 1 − δ
δ
(
I/M − q) (1 + qδ (α − 1)) − qδ (1 − δ) (α − 1) .
Proof. The values Vps and V
p
w can be re-written as
Vps =
(1 − δ) In + δ (1 − Pr (S|∅))Vpw
1 − δPr (S|∅)
Vpw =
(1 − δ) Mn q + δ
[
qPr (S|BW) + (1 − q) Pr (S|∅)]Vps
1 − δ [q (1 − Pr (S|BW)) + (1 − q) (1 − Pr (S|∅))]
Combining the above two equations, we get
Vps =
1
n
I
{
1 − δ [1 − Pr (S|∅) − q (Pr (S|BW) − Pr (S|∅))]} + δ (1 − Pr (S|∅))Mq
1 + qδ (Pr (S|BW) − Pr (S|∅)) .
Substituting this into (5.1) gives the result.
We have the following immediate corollary.
Corollary 1 C (I,M) is strictly decreasing in I, and strictly increasing in M.
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According to Corollary 1, it is easier to sustain collusion when I is large, and
M is small.
The establishment of a press club is mutually beneficial for the strong party
and the news companies: the strong ruling party always prefers media capture
to a free press because its reelection probability is enhanced when the public
does not hear any bad news about its ruling. The news companies also benefit
from the implicit collusion because their payoff is higher than being an inde-
pendent press, as can be easily seen from the incentive compatibility constraint
(5.1).
Combining the analysis in scenario 2 and 3 above, we see that when n is
big enough, a press club is necessary to establish media capture. A similar
result is obtained in Besley and Prat (2006), which shows that media pluralism
provides effective protection against capture. However, our analysis shows that
the mere existence of a press club is not sufficient to guarantee media capture.
A further necessary condition (and sufficient in our simple environment) for
the sustainability of media capture is a large value of Pr (S|∅), i.e. a sufficiently
uneven political strength distribution.
Remark 1 (Election Outcome) When the strong party is ruling, its reelection prob-
ability is Pr (S|∅) in the presence of media capture, and (1 − q) Pr (S|∅) + qPr (S|BS)
without media capture. According to Proposition 1, whether media capture occurs in
equilibrium depends on whether Pr (S|∅) exceeds the threshold value C (I,M) or not.
The equilibrium election outcome may therefore be very sensitive to Pr (S|∅), especially
when it is close to C (I,M).
Remark 2 (Social Welfare) Since we assume every political party is of the same
ability, there is no welfare gain with a more transparent government in our model.
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However, it is possible to extend the model by incorporating a rent-seeking decision
by the ruling party. Then, it is clear that an opaque government is detrimental to
the public’s welfare. Moreover, the media can affect political outcomes through setting
agendas. If it is captured, this function is lost, leading to a further decrease in social
welfare.10)
6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this section, we discuss how the model presented above explains the persis-
tence of the institutional arrangements in the press industry in the postwar era
of Japan.
1955-1993 It is commonly believed that to the average Japanese, the LDP is the
party responsible for Japan’s prosperity in postwar era. In fact, all the dramatic
change since the end of World War II is a tribute to the stability and efficiency
the government has provided under the leadership of the LDP. In contrast, the
opposing parties were believed to be weak and incompetent. In our model, this
is translated to the large value of Pr (S|∅), the high probability that the LDP is
reelected when there is no bad news reported. The satisfaction of the general
public about the LDP politics can also be interpreted as small M, a low market
value of scandals.
In addition, while the LDP monopolized political power from 1955 to 1993,
only a handful of party leaders determined policy matters, personnel matters,
and strategies. Therefore, reporters tended to attach great importance to infor-
mation from those leaders. The reporters’ reliance on those information can be
10)We appreciate an anonymous referee for raising this point.
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interpreted as a large value of I.
According to Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, the large value of Pr (S|∅), the
small value of M, and the large value of I are conducive to the cozy relationship
between the LDP and the media. They also explains the persistence of kisha
club systems before 1993.
1993-2009 In 1993, the 38 years of single-party ruling by the LDP ended. This
is said to be the result of two huge political scandals that are revealed by the
media which are outsiders of the kisha club system, and the burst of the bubble
economy. As a result, Japanese people started to question the superiority
of the LDP-style politics. Since then, no single party has managed to steer
the government of Japan, i.e., the unquestionable hegemony by the LDP has
ended. In the language of our model, the probability of reelection without bad
news Pr (S|∅) has dropped, and the market value of scandal M has increased.
Furthermore, in addition to the structural change mentioned in section three,
the Japanese people saw the tremendous increase in the political influence
wielded by “young” Diet members, which can be interpreted as a decrease in I.
According to Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, the smaller value of Pr (S|∅),
the larger value of M, and the smaller value of I make the collusion between
the LDP and the media industry, as well as the monopolization of information
by the kisha club system is becoming harder to sustain.
References
Besley, T., R. Burgees, and A. Prat (2002): “Mass Media and Political Account-
ability,” in The Right to Tell: The Role of Mass Media in Economic Development,
29
ed. by R. Islam, pp. 45–60. World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Besley, T., and A. Prat (2006): “Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media
Capture and Government Accountability,” American Economic Review, 96(3),
720–736.
Coughlin, W. (1952): Conquered Press : TheMacArthur Era in Japanese Journalism.
Pacific Books, Palo Alto.
de Lange, W. (1998): A History of Japanese Journalism. Japan Library, Brighton.
Feldman, O. (1993): Politics and the News Media in Japan. Univerity of Michigan
Press, Ann Arbor.
(2004): Talking Politics in Japan Today. Sussex Academic Press, Brighton.
FreedomHouse (2008): “Press Freedom Survey 2008,”
http://www.freedomhouse.org/.
Freeman, L. A. (2000): Closing the shop : information cartels and Japan’s mass media.
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Yamamoto, T. (1989): “The Press Clubs of Japan,” Journal of Japanese Studies,
15(2), 371–388.
30
